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Abstract—Extortion is a unique crime in that it involves a
long-term interaction between the victim and the perpetrator.
It is also an interesting crime in that it seems to afflict whole
communities, cities or even countries. Extortion is often modelled
as an interdependent choice between extorter and extortee using
a game theoretic framework. Although a game theoretic model
takes into account the first uniqueness of a long-term relationship
but leaves out the social influence factors that can make extortion
endemic within a social group or society. In this paper we present
an agent-based model which looks at the decision making of
extortees from a social perspective, transforming the traditional
extortion game into a collective problem.
I. BACKGROUND
The kind of extortion in this paper is the kind executed
by organised crime groups such as the Italian Mafia: the
request of protection money from entrepreneurs, usually small
businesses like restaurants and shops. Extorters usually ask
for a relatively small amount of money on a monthly basis,
promising to protect the entrepreneur against criminals. There
are other kinds of extortion such as kidnapping and blackmail,
which we are not concerned with here as the dynamics are
rather different. Much of the literature on extortion rackets
uses game theory to operationalise extorter and entrepreneur
decision-making [1]; [2]. What is usually operationalised is a
game matrix between an extortee, who can decide to pay or
not and an extorter, who can decide to punish or not. Although
modelling this interaction as an interdependent choice makes
intuitive sense, the interaction with the extorter is not the only
interaction extortees participate in: As usually extorters have
several extortees, there is also in interaction between extortees,
albeit an indirect one. The structure of this interaction is as
follows: for each individual extortee it is more beneficial to
pay the money requested by the extorter than to be punished.
However, if none of the extortees paid, extorters might soon
leave them alone as it would not be profitable to keep on
punishing. This interaction is also an interdependent choice of
the form of a common good’s problem.
This paper discusses a model of extortion racket systems
that focuses on the decision space of extortees. Using the
framework of team reasoning [3]; [4]; [5] the simulation model
explores the consequences of a traditional individual utility
maximisation and a utility maximising decision from a group
perspective.
II. MODEL
There are two kinds of agents: Extorters and entrepreneurs.
Extorters approach an entrepreneur with an extortion request.
Entrepreneurs decide whether to pay or refuse payment,
depending on the monetary utility of paying or not. The
decision procedure is:
If p× a× d < m refuse, pay otherwise, (1)
where p is the perceived punishment probability, a an
entrepreneur’s attitude to risk, d the possible damage caused
by punishment and m the amount of money requested by
the extorter. p and a are rational numbers between 0 and
1. The attitude-to-risk (a) is normally distributed over the
entrepreneurs at initialisation of the model and static. p is
set to 1 when an entrepreneur observes a punishment in its
neighbourhood and step-by-step reduces by 0.01 each step no
punishment is observed. d is set at 1M monetary units. On the
right hand side of the inequality m is the amount of money
requested by the extorter. Entrepreneurs decide intermittently
whether they want to continue paying the extorter or start
resisting.
Extorters punish non-payment but punishment costs so they
they can only punish if their wealth is greater than the cost of
punishment. We implement three punishment regimes leading
to different levels of punishment.
1) Whenever an entrepreneur resists there is a punishment
from the extorter. (High level of punsihment.)
2) An extorter punishes resistance unless they observed a
punishment in their neighbourhood in the last round.
(Medium level of punishment and feedback of neigh-
bourhood structure.)
3) An extorter only punishes if the number of entrepreneurs
who resist its extortion demands is greater than the
number of acquiescent entrepreneurs. (Medium level
of punishment and feedback between resistance and
punishment.)
Money is injected into the system exogenously at the
entrepreneurs’ payday in which each gets a mean income of
300 (normally distributed). The pizzo m is set at 50; extorters
are also paid on payday.
This model is seen as a basic implementation of an
interdependent choice game tree in which entrepreneurs
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
decide to pay or not depending on the monetary utility
of either action. Extorters punish or not depending on the
punishment regime. The main parameters we vary are the
punishment regime and the neighbourhood radius, i.e., the
level and the deterrence reach of punishment. This model
implements individual utility maximisation and running the
simulation shows that individualist utility maximisation is
able to recreate a stylised fact of extortion rackets: high
levels of compliance with low levels of punishment. Only if
the reach of deterrence is rather low, does resistance become
more prevalent but a low reach of deterrence, equivalent with
a lack of information, is very unrealistic as people talk and
the media reports attacks on entrepreneurs.
To operationalise team reasoning we implement the following
decision function:
If p× a× d < G×m refuse, pay otherwise. (2)
The left hand side of this inequality is the same as in (1).
On the right hand side is the sum of pizzo paments m the
group would pay if they all paid. If it is better for the group
not to pay, collectively minded agents resist the extorter.
The above decision mechanism is implemented on two
social structures, one being a networked structure, i.e., the
relevant group is constructed by taking all agents within a
certain radius (cf. [6]), the other a set of transitive groups
achieved by partitioning the grid into a number of fields.
We implement societies with different levels of collectively
minded agents. For these societies we looked again at punish-
ment regimes and neighbourhood radii but also at the influence
of group size and the mix of individualistic and collectively
minded agents in the society. First results show that groups
have to be sufficiently large to make a difference to the resis-
tance outcome. The effect of group size is slightly dampened if
groups are transitive but not significantly different. This result
is a result on the rather stripped down operationalisation of
‘team reasoning’ we employ. But literature on trust and groups
shows that groups in which people think collectively and keep
cooperating need to be rather small [7].
III. CONCLUSIONS
It seems rather intuitive that to get rid of extortion, people
have to stop paying extorters. We have preliminary results that
show that the goal of increased resistance might be obtained
by making people consider the group payoff (team reasoning)
rather than just reason about their own utility in particular
in the case of far reaching deterrence. The results, however,
also show that the size of the group has to be rather large
for to make a significant difference to levels of resistance.
One of the starting points for this simulation was the rise of
the Addio Pizzo movement, first in Sicily but spreading to
all areas affected by the Mafia.1 Addio Pizzo has managed to
1For more detail on the Addio Pizzo movement see
http://www.addiopizzo.org/english.asp.
raise levels of resistance in the population of entrepreneurs.
We thought that the explanation might be that entrepreneurs
feel part of a group changing their decision mechanism to a
collective one. An interpretation of our results is that only
institutionalised groups can make a difference in this setting
as trust will be engendered through the social norms governing
the group. Addio Pizzo would thus make a difference as they
bring the group size an entrepreneur feels part of up to a
relevant level (cf. [8] for a study on the interaction of trust,
norms and group size).
Future work is to look at the dynamics of resistance more
closely, e.g. to investigate the effect of clustering of collectivist
agents (i.e. “bleeding the extorter dry”), having more sophis-
ticated implementations of team reasoning and to analyse the
networked and transitive group constructions in more detail.
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